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Lending to Finance the War
IN BRITAIN, as in other warring countries, lending institutions found
themselves more and more heavily involved in government finance as
the war progressed. As outlined in Chapter 3, financial concerns as-
sisted the government with exchange control, credit restrictions, and
rationing, and provided short-term credits to meet swelling tax pay-
ments. They also participated in the financing of war industries by
making direct loans. Their chief wartime function, however, was to
make loans to the government and to help it borrow from the public.
GOVERNMENT BORROWING
The government's demand for funds to finance war industries and
military operations in part replaced normal peacetime demands, but in
part was superimposed upon them. The net effect was to raise the total
demand for credit, and to concentrate it in the hands of the govern-
ment. Lending institutions accordingly had to adapt their operations to
the larger volume and changed nature of the demand.
The growth and composition of the British government's wartime
borrowing are shown in Tables 5 and 6. Short-term obligations (less
than one year) were the chief instrument of new indebtedness, provid-
ing more than half the increase in total marketable securities. At first
sight it appears that Britain made less use of intermediate-term (1 to 5
years) and long-term obligations, and greater use of short-term bor-
rowing than did the United States and Canada; at the end of the fiscal
year 1946, 53 percent of the increase in British marketable public se-
curities 1consistedof obligations maturing within one year, compared
with 38 percent in the United States and 15 percent in Canada. How-
ever, much of the increase in British floating debt comprised "ways-
and-means advances" and Treasury bills. Ways-and-means advances
consisted partly of loans to the Treasury from other government de-
partments, and the tap issue of Treasury bills was held almost entirely
by government departments, government insurance funds, the Ex-
change Equalization Account, and overseas governments, holding ster-





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.Table 6—MATURITY DISTRIBUTION OF MARKETABLE GOVERNMENT
SECURITIES AT END OF FISCAL YEARS FOR UNITED KINGDOM,
UNITED STATES, AND CANADAa
(pound and dollar figures in millions)
Maturity United KingdomUnited States Canada
Within 1 Year
1939 £992 $5,094 $679
1946 7,126 62,091 2,499
Increase as percent of increasein
total public marketable debt 53% 38% 15%
1 to 5 Years
1939 £353 $13,394 $1,024
1946 1,343 35,055 4,738
Increase as percent of increasein
total public marketable debt 9% 14% 27%
Over 5 Years
1939 £5,476 $20,927 $2,735
1946 9,896 92,501 10,078
Increase as percent of increasein
total public marketable debt 38% 48% 58%
a From compilations prepared for the National Bureau of Economic Research by the
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and the Bank of Canada.
Although non-marketable, Treasury deposit receipts arc included for the United
Kingdom and Treasury deposit certificates for Canada, because of their similarity
to Treasury bills. Fiscal years for the United Kingdom and Canada end on March 31
and for the United States on June 30.
governmental, and exclusion of the intra-governmental debt would
reverse the relative positions of Britain and the United States and
bring Britain and Canada much closer together. It should also be noted
that when war broke out the share of total debt consisting of obliga-
tions with maturities of five years or less was much smaller in Britain
than in the other two countries. By the end of fiscal 1946, however,
the proportion had increased so that such obligations were 46 percent
of the British marketable debt, compared with 42 percent in Canada
and 51 percent in the United States.
Treasury bills—tender and tap—were the main instrument of float-
ing indebtedness, constituting over half of the total wartime floating
debt. After the third year of war, however, increases of floating debt
consisted chiefly of Treasury deposit receipts ("TDR's"), .just as the
growth of Canadian short-term debt was composed mainly of Treasury
deposit certificates. This new form of government security was intro-
duced in Great Britain in July 1940, bore interest at the rate of 11/8
percent per annum for six months, compared with1percent per
annum for three months on Treasury bills, and was issued only to Eng-
38lish and Scottish banks.2 The Treasury stated its requirements of Treas-
ury deposits every week, and allotment was made by agreement among
these banks. The TDR's were non-negotiable. They could be redeemed
prior to maturity "in case of emergency," subject to a discount at Bank
rate, but it probably would have required a substantial "emergency" to
induce the banks to use this privilege. Furthermore, TDR's could be
tendered in payment for purchases of government obligations other than
Treasury bills, whether on the bank's own account or on their custom-
ers' accounts, and after the first year or so this privilege was exercised
frequently and substantially, especially during war loan campaigns.
From the Treasury's viewpoint, there were several reasons for the
substitution of TDR's for Treasury bills. The new system enabled the
Treasury to borrow directly from the banks for six months, at a rate
only about '/8 of 1 percent higher than the 3-month Treasury bill rate,
and perhaps permitted more exact adjustment of revenues to outflows.
Since the TDR's were non-negotiable, and the penalty on encashment
prior to maturity for purposes other than conversion to government
long-terms was a deterrent to liquidation, they afforded the Treasury
control over its balances. At the same time, the prior encashment fa-
cility meant that if necessary the banks could draw on the Treasury's
own balance at the Bank of England, and thus avoid undue pressure
on the money market which would result from the transfer of public
loan subscriptions to the Exchequer.
The tax reserve certificate was another new short-term credit instru-
ment which grew in importance. It performed much the same function
as the United States tax certificate,3 being designed to divert to the
Treasury deposits held idle in anticipation of tax payments. However,
the British certificates, the income from which was tax-free, bore 1 per-
cent interest if used for taxes, while the United States certificates, tax-
able as regards income, bore interest of from '/2 of 1 percent to 2 per-
cent. Since under the British income tax the standard rate was 50
percent of taxable income, a tax-free 1 percent was equivalent to a
taxable minimum of 2 percent gross. For someone in the 80 percent
tax bracket, the tax-free 1 percent was equivalent to 5 percent gross.
Thus the tax certificates were an attractive investment, particularly
for businesses and for people in the upper income groups, and sub-
2 Cf. W. T. C. King and Paul Bareau, The London Money Market and Banking
System in the Second Eighteen Months of War (National Institute of Economic and
Social Research, London, 1942) and Charlotte Muller, "British War Finance and
the Banks," The Journal of Business of the University of Chicago, April 1943, p. 86.
Issues of American tax certificates were discontinued in June 1943, when
Treasury tax savings notes of Series A were discontinued, and Treasury notes of
Tax Series C were redesignated Treasury savings notes of Series C.
39scriptions to them may not have been entirely from otherwise idle
funds. The tax-free feature was attacked on the grounds that for indi-
viduals in the 47'/2percentsurtax bracket, the return on tax certifi-
cates was equivalent to 40 percent on any taxable security, while for
those liable only to the standard income tax rate it was equal to just
2 percent.
In marketing long-term issues, the British attempted to provide se-
curities suitable for "large" and "small" savings, and special emphasis
was laid on the latter. The distinction was based on the size of the
individual subscription expected and on the income group that the
obligation was meant to reach. The chief differences between the two
types of security were their tax status and denomination. National sav-
ings certificates and national defense bonds were small in denomina-
tion, and therefore regarded as particularly suitable for small investors.
The 15s. savings certificates yielded a tax-free 3.17 percent if held to
maturity and were freely redeemable; holdings were limited to 500 cer-
tificates. The £1 savings certificates yielded only 1.41 percent free of
taxes, were cashable only after 90 days, and were limited to holdings
of 250 certificates. The 3 percent defense bonds were subject to tax,
were cashable at 6 months' notice, and were limited to holdings of
£1,000. The £1 issue of savings certificates and the 3 percent national
defense bonds were designed for small savers who had acquired their
full quota of 15s. savings certificates. All issues intended for small savers
were sold through Post Offices, Trustee Savings Banks, and Savings
Groups. For statistical purposes, the government also considered in-
creased balances in Post Offices and Trustee Savings Banks as small
savings.
The obligations aimed at large investors consisted of the tap issues
of 3 percent savings bonds, 2Y2 percent war bonds, and 1 3/4percent
Exchequer bonds, which were sold through the Bank of England and
on the Stock Exchange by existing holders. These were available in
large denominations at the Bank of England and smaller
denominations at the Post Offices and Trustee Savings
Banks.
Needless to say, any individual investor, whatever his income, prob-
ably obtained his, quota of tax-free obligations before buying others; for
taxpayers, the 3.17 percent tax-free yield on 15s. savings certificates.
was equivalent to a minimum of 6 1/3 percent on other securities. Be-
cause of the restricted quota on issues designed for small savers, and
the greater inconvenience of the smaller denominations, institutions and
people with high incomes no doubt invested mainly in other issues. It
40does not follow automatically that the bulk of "small" savings came
from families with small incomes. Statistical inquiries conducted in
1942 suggest that less than half of small savings up to that time came
from the lower income groups. However, as working class earnings
continued to rise, and medium and large investors reached the statu-
tory limit to holdings of savings certificates and defense bonds, it seems
likely that the proportion of these issues held by the lower income
groups was somewhat higher in the later years of the war.4
The stimulation of public saving was entrusted mainly to the Na-
tional War Savings Committee, an outgrowth of the Savings Move-
ment which was launched in 1916 and which continued throughout
the interwar period. The Committee, set up in November 1939, con-
sisted of members appointed by the Treasury, representing interested
agencies and organizations, and eighteen members elected by the Local
Savings Committees, one for each of the twelve regions and each of the
six great cities. There was an official staff of 1,600, including a Com-
missioner for each of the twelve regions, supplemented by some 600,-
000 voluntary workers. As the British Information Services put it, the
local savings groups were the "cells" of the movement.5 These groups
were organized by industries, schools, neighborhoods, and branches of
the Armed Forces. The number of such groups grew from 41,500 be-
fore the war to over 320,000 in July 1944, at which time their mem-
bership covered one-third of the total population. The Committee
relied mainly on a steady flow of reminders of the need for saving, and
except for the War Loan of March 1940, all long-term issues were on
tap. However, the Committee did organize a series of special drives,
similar to the American and Canadian war loan campaigns.
LENDING BY THE BANK OF ENGLAND
War brought closer collaboration between the Treasury and the
Central Bank in all belligerent countries. The Treasury in Great Brit-
ain, as in the United States and Canada, adopted a deliberate policy
of "pegging" the interest structure at a low level,6 and the cooperation
of the Central Bank was essential to this policy in all three countries.
In accordance with traditional practice in time of crisis, the Bank
Cf. M. Kalecki, "The Problem of 'Small' Savings," Bulletin of the Oxford
Institute of Statistics, Vol. 5, No. 16, November 20, 1943.
5BritishInformation Services, The British War Savings Campaign, I.D. 395
(April 1943).
6Ina statement to the House of Commons on April12,1943, Sir Kingsley
Wood remarked, "During this war we have stabilized the general complex of
interest rates at a level so low as would have been thought impossible by anyone
who merely based himself on the experience of the last war."
41of England raised its Bank rate shortly before the outbreak of hostilities
—from 2 to 4 percent. However, in keeping with the Treasury policy
of maintaining a low rate of interest, the Bank rate was reduced to 3
percent on September 28, 1939, and to 2 percent on October 29, 1939,
where it was held throughout the war. With world conditions as they
were, it is unlikely that a higher Bank rate would have increased the
supply of foreign exchange, either by attracting capital or by increas-
ing exports.7 In any case, responsibility for controlling foreign exchange
rates was taken over by the Treasury's Exchange Equalization Fund,
and the Bank served merely as the principal agent for operation of the
Fund. During the war, central banking policy was determined mainly
by domestic considerations.
In war as in peace, the Bank acted as the government's agent in the
flotation of loans. It also lent directly to the government through ways-
and-means advances and purchases of government obligations. How-
ever, since the Treasury in World War II borrowed from the com-
mercial banks directly by means of TDR's, Bank ways-and-means ad-
vances were an insignificant aspect of war finance, and total Bank
lending to the government was small.
By far the most important function of the Bank was to provide
reserves to the joint stock banks, to help them buy government obliga-
tions, and to carry on as much of their traditional task of financing
trade and industry as was compatible with a maximum war effort. In
the years between the two World Wars, the Bank altered the volume of
bank reserves according to the demand for credit from the commercial
banks and to the Bank's own canons of sound finance, including its
judgments regarding the proper balance between protecting the gold
standard and reducing unemployment. During the war, the commer-
cial banks lent to the government according to Treasury needs, and to
industry, commerce, and consumers according to Treasury advice; the
necessary reserves for these operations were provided by the Bank of
England, by buying Treasury bills. As a rule the commercial banks met
any stringency resulting from an exceptionally large issue of TDR's,
or from heavy revenue payments to the Treasury, by calling funds from
7 In World War I, likewise, the Bank consulted the Treasury when changes in
the rate were made. The preponderance of Treasury bills in the discount market
weakened the control of the open market rate on bills, and transferred
much of the power over market rates to the Treasury. As stated in Chapter 2,
shortly after the outbreak of war the Bank rate was reduced from its crisis peak
of 10 percent to 5 percent, and it remained between 5 and 6 percent for the
duration of the war. Had the financial authorities been concerned only with
domestic policy and felt no need to use the discount rate to assist in supporting
the pound, the rate might have been reduced further.
42the discount houses, which were in turn compelled to sell Treasury bills
to the Bank of England. Sometimes, however, the Bank bought bills
directly from the commercial banks, usually at the market rate. In
either case, the cash that the Bank paid for bills found its way into the
commercial banks' tills or into their deposits with the Bank of Eng-
land, thus increasing reserve ratios.
In September 1939, virtually all of the Issue Department's gold re-
serve million) was transferred to the Exchange Equalization
Account. "Lending" by the Issue Department in connection with cur-
rency increases constituted nearly 87 percent of the Bank's wartime
lending to the government. The increase in the Banking Department
holdings of government securities was only £159 million to the end of
the war period, less than 1 percent of the rise in national debt. Hold-
ings by. the Issue Department, on the other hand, rose by £1,054 mil-
lion, just 7 percent of the increase in national debt. Thus, total central
bank loans to the government were only 8 of the increase in
debt. Over the fiscal years 1939-45, the Federal Reserve Banks ab-
sorbed 9 percent of the increase in the United States national debt, and
the Bank of Canada 14 percent of the Canadian.
LENDING BY THE JOINT STOCK BANKS
The role of the joint stock banks in war finance was threefold: to
buy government obligations themselves, to assist in the sale of govern-
ment securities to institutional and other investors, and to make direct
advances to war industries. The banks served as agents for the sale of
war bonds, and they did much to stimulate and facilitate public sub-
scriptions. Rates of interest paid on bank deposits were reduced below
the prewar level early in the war, and were subject to a maximum of
1 percent. The banks likewise refrained from lending for personal pur-
poses and nonessential undertakings. The embargo on new capital is-
sues applied to borrowing from banks with the intention of repaying
the loan out of proceeds from a subsequent issue of securities; and
while the law applied to the borrower's action and not to the lender's,
the banks undertook to scrutinize the purposes of loans and to refuse
them if they were satisfied with their legality.
The commercial banks absorbed only 15 percent of the wartime
increase in national debt; this percentage was moderately lower than
that in Canada and less than half as much as in the United States.
Commercial bank holdings of governments included intermediate- and
long-term as well as short-term securities. During the war years, hold-
ings of intermediate- and long-term governments increased markedly,
both absolutely and relative to total assets, and when the war ended
43they comprised 22 percent of assets of the London clearing banks. This
increase was largely the result of the banks' subscription of about
£300 million to the first two loans. Since the Treasury, with the co-
operation of the Bank of England, provided the banks with reserves
and at the same time limited lending to business, the banks needed no
direct urging to induce them to buy government securities during the
war. During the last three years of the war, however, the banks' port-
folios of long-terms were virtually constant, reflecting the government's
continually increasing success in placing war loans with the general
public.
In the first year of war, the banks followed the pattern of World
War 1 by increasing their bill holdings considerably. After August
1940 bills were largely replaced by TDR's, which in August 1945 com-
prised 39 percent of the commercial banks' total assets, contrasted with
4 percent for Treasury bills. The banks' holdings of bills represented
less than 5 percent of total Treasury bills outstanding at that time.
As mentioned above, TDR's had somewhat limited liquidity. They
could be redeemed prior to maturity, subject to the penalty of discount-
ing at Bank rate, in case of emergency; but discounting a 11/8 percent
security at the 2 percent Bank rate would, according to The Econo-
mist, "be too expensive, and perhaps too undignified, a procedure to
commend itself to the banks, except on very abnormal occasions." 8
Billswere therefore a better reserve against such contingencies as tax
payments by depositors. On the other hand, the TDR's had the advan-
tage of being redeemable at par to pay for longer-term governments
bought by a bank itself or by a customer. Consequently, subscriptions
to war loans by depositors could be met by temporary depletion of the
banks' TDR holdings instead of by temporary decreases in reserves;
and the yield on TDR's was slightly higher than that on Treasury bills.
At the outbreak of war, it was an open question whether or not
the Treasury's request that the banks curtail advances for "nonessential
purposes" covered borrowing for the purchase of war loans. When the
March 1940 war loan was tendered, the banks offered to grant facili-
ties to their customers for subscribing to the issue, but such facilities
were to be granted only for a very short period and only after careful
consideration of each case. It is believed that very little use was made
of the banks' offer, and by February 1942 the Treasury had expressly
requested the public not to borrow for the purpose of buying war
bonds.
BQuotedby Donald F. Heatherington in "British Banking and Finance," Foreign
Commerce Weekly, July 24, 1943, p. 6.
44 SHowever, the banks helped to finance the discount market's holdings
of Treasury bills. Most of these were held on day-to-day money loaned
from the commercial banks. The bulk of Treasury bills was held by
government departments and various official and semi-official .bodies,
such as government insurance agencies, the Bank of England, and
Dominion and other sterling-area central banks.
The banks not only assisted the Treasury with war finance but they
also had their usual task of providing trade and industry with short-
term credit. The traditional policy of the banks was one of making
"self-liquidating" advances and of "not interfering in their clients' busi-
ness affairs" by keeping most of their loans down to "average size."°
When the war began the banks were asked by the government to ex-
tend short-term credit liberally to government contractors and sub-
contractors, even if this meant relaxation of peacetime standards of
"sound finance." In order to aid the banks in this part of their con-
tribution to the war effort, and to provide them with ready means of
verifying the existence and exact status of their customers' war con-
tracts, liaison officers were appointed by the banks to the supply min-
istries, and by the supply ministries to the banks. They served as a chan-
nel for informal discussion; and this system enabled the joint stock
banks to extend overdraft facilities to war-essential industries very much
in excess of what would normally be considered safe.
The government undertook to finance directly a large part of war
industry. A good share of the armaments production was carried on
by Royal Ordnance Factories entirely owned and operated by the
government.'0 Other war plants were government owned but privately
operated. In some cases the government supplied the fixed capital to
these concerns, the private contractors receiving a "reasonable profit"
on the working capital that they provided. In other cases the govern-
ment supplied all the capital, and paid the contractors a fee for con-
struction based on cost,and a fee for management based on output.
From the beginning of the war to the end of 1942, the government
extended capital assistance amounting to nearly £293.6 million." Ex-
According to evidence before the Macmillan Committee in 1930, the average
overdraft of Lloyds Bank was £10,900 to £15,600 for industrial credits, £561 for
personal and professional loans, and £1,151 for advances as a whole. (Minutes of
Evidence Taken before the Committee on Finance and Industry, London, 1931,
Vol. I, p. 128.)
10 These plants turned Out 60 or 70 percent of the explosives and 66 2/3 percent
of the guns produced in Great Britain (Report of the Minister of Supply to the
House of Commons, August 5,1942, House of Commons Debates, 1942, Cols.
107 1-83).
Select Committee on National Expenditures, Sixteenth Report, Session 1942-43,
State-owned Assets, pp. 4-6.
45cept for armaments, however, most war plants were privately owned
and operated. The government aided long-term financing of these pri-
vate firms by permitting them to raise money in the capital market,
and by allowing generous rates of amortization for tax purposes.
The rapidity of expansion, the special risks of war operations, and
the novelty of type and size of war contracts, created short-term credit
requirements of a sort not easily met by traditional banking procedures.
Accordingly, the supply ministries made increasing use of monthly
progress payments, whereby the government extended funds, monthly,
on work in progress under war contracts. Such payments ran as high
as 90 percent of total expenditures incurred by a contractor during a
month. The payments were made against "progress certificates," which
testified to the exact expenditures incurred in connection with a govern-
ment contract, and were signed by the firm's auditor or accountant.
Government short-term finance through progress payments was so
general as to leave little scope for bank credit. Bank loans were used
mainly for tiding over firms between the actual outlay and the next
monthly progress payment. The wartime decline in advances indicates
that the banks financed only a small fraction of the war industries'
short-term credit requirements, and that this was insufficient to offset
the diminishing requirements of civilian industries.
LENDING BY THE DISCOUNT MARKET
The diminishing importance of the commercial bill in the London
discount market during the twenties and thirties helps explain the
market's smooth transition to war conditions. The war was anticipated,
and as it drew nearer the acceptance houses °required customers im-
porting through German ports to have ample sterling funds in their
accounts. Nevertheless, the government took stringent precautions on
the day that war was declared to prevent a repetition of the panic that
occurred in the exchange market at the outbreak of World War I. A
government War Risks Insurance Office was opened, and the Treasury
instructed the Bank of England to accommodate acceptance houses
that might be called upon to meet their liabilities while deprived of
the necessary remittances from their clients. This accommodation was
offered at the punitive cost of 2 percent above Bank rate, with a mini-
mum of 6 percent.
After the outbreak of war, the market's commercial business declined
steadily, owing partly to Germany's occupation of the continent, partly
to bulk purchases by government departments, and partly to the Lend-
Lease Agreement, which took care of a large portion of Great Britain's
trade with the United States. Defense regulations modified the nature
46of some acceptances by forbidding loans to nonresidents. This neces-
sitated the replacement of acceptance credits by sight credits, or accept-
ances fully covered by sterling accounts. As in World War I, Treasury
bills assumed paramount importance in the discount market, and the
Treasury again acquired a large degree of influence on the open mar-
ket bill rate.
After a short flurry when war broke out the rate on three-month
Treasury bills was held virtually constant at about 1.01 percent, com-
pared with the rate on day-to-day loans, which was around 1 percent,
leaving a slender margin for the market. However, on short- and inter-
mediate-term bonds, which comprised an ever-growing share of dis-
count market investments during the war, the profit margin was con-
siderably greater.
LENDING BY THE CAPITAL MARKET
An embargo was imposed on new capital issues under "Defense
(Finance) Regulations" at the very beginning of the war. Issues in
excess of £5,000 in any one year were made illegal, except when spe-
cifically approved by the Treasury. "Issue" was defined broadly, to in-
clude mortgages and bank loans to be repaid from the proceeds of
public issues, as well as public offerings of securities for sale or sub-
scription. Blanket exemptions included issues involving no new cash
subscriptions (such as those made only to amalgamate two or more
companies or to a firm's capital), issues to any government
department, and issues to provide direct security for bank advances.
Otherv rise "the of new securities other than Government war
loans" had to be confined to "issues to raise money for essential serv-
ices and enterprises or to provide for obligatory repayments of matur-
ing debt",12 as determined by the Treasury. Issues by firms operating
in the United Kingdom or the Empire were allowed only if they were
"advisable in the national interest," while issues for undertakings out-
side the Empire were permitted only "in special circumstances in cases
of urgent necessity."
A Capital Issues Committee, composed of representatives of the busi-
ness organizations most concerned with the capital market, reviewed
applications for permission to float an issue, and made recommenda-
tions to the Treasury based on its findings. The majority of actual ap-
plications (as distinct from inquiries) were approved. The concerns
allowed to go to the market for capital were mainly engineering and
public utility enterprises.
12 Quoted by W. F. Crick in An Outline of Wartime Financial Control in the
United Kingdom (London, 1941) p. 11.
47In November 1942, a new regulation was added prohibiting agree-
ments to do, at some future date (when regulations would be relaxed),
anything that was then illegal under the Defense (Finance) Regula-
tions.13 Special regulations were also issued at various times during the
war to prevent payment of interest on capital items to enemy interests.
Disposal of securities in which there was a nonresident interest was
made subject to license in the spring of 1940, and later additional con-
trols were imposed on collection of both income and capital items on
securities belànging to residents of such neutral countries as Switzer-
land, Sweden, Spain, and PortugaL14
GENERAL RESULTS OF BRITISH WARTIME BORROWING
Like the United States and Canada, Britain was able to carry through
its huge wartime borrowing operations and at the same time to
reduce interest rates. The decline in the average interest cost of the
war debt, which fell from 3.1 percent in March 1939 to 2.4 percent
in March 1945, was mainly a result of the change in debt
The latter figure compares with 1.9 percent in the United States and
2.6 percent in Canada.
Despite the reductions in British interest rates after 1931 (Table
7), Britain entered the war with both short- and long-term rates on
government debt somewhat higher than in Canada and considerably
higher than in the United States. Prices of British long-term securities
were then abnormally low, however, and they subsequently recovered
to levels midway between the American and Canadian. Except for an
initial flurry when war broke Out, and for a brief period in the spring
and summer of 1943 when allied military led to some shift—
ing from government to other securities, the yields on long-terms fol-.
lowed a downward course throughout the war. As Table 7 shows,
yields on corporate bonds and industrial securities moved in sympathy
so far as wartime trends are concerned. Short-term rates rose sharply
at the very beginning of the war, but promptly fell again and remained
quite stable throughout the balance of the war period.
13 Order-in-Council S. R. & 0. 1942, No. 2096.
14 Cf. The Banker, November 1940,pp.84if.; April 1940, pp. 139 if.; June
article by J. Mead, "Bank Lending and the Capital Issues Control," pp. 9-18; April
1941, article by C. J. Shimmins, "Securities Work in Wartime"; January 1944
and August 1944, passim.
The basis of this statement is a computation of the average interest Cost that
would have prevailed on the debt shown for 1945 in Table 7, at the interest rates
prevailing for the three main categories of debt in 1939.
48A second major feature of Britain's fiscal policy was the large pro-
portion of the wartime increase in debt in Britain which was placed
outside the banking system. Approximately '75percentof the increase
in debt from 1938 to 1945 was sold outside the Bank of England and
the joint stock banks; comparable figures for Canada and the United
States are approximately 77 and 60 percent, respectively.. The reasons
for these differences, in terms of the inducements offered and the
preferences of investors to place funds in government securities, and
the effects of the loan campaigns on the relative degree and timing
of inflation in the three countries, are interesting and important sub-
jects for analysis but lie outside the scope of this paper. There can be
little doubt, however, that sales of government obligations to the pub-
lic rather than to the banks helped to limit private expenditures during
the war, and that the success of the loan campaigns was a factor in
the relative, stability of British prices after 1941.










1931 5.60% 4.57% 5.01% 6.18% 6.75% 6.94%
1938 .93 3.56 3.64 4.15 4.65 6.13
1943 1.017 3.16 3.30 3.91 4.34 4.43
1944 1.004 3.08 3.28 3.82 4.20 4.16
1945,Sept. 1.010 2.83 3.21 3.80 4.23 4.27
a Data on Treasury bills for 1931 are from Banking and Monetary Statistics (Board
of Governors of Federal Reserve System, 1943) p. 660; for 1938-45, from Statistical
Summary, Bank of Canada. Data on other secmities are from The Economist,
October 6, 1945, p. 494.
bEndof period indicated.
49